DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: Timothy Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: Matthew Duncan and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending June 10, 2011

W78 Operations: On May 25, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) issued weapon response to support completing the disassembly of the W78 unit with the damaged detonator cable assembly. B&W and LANL personnel worked through some documentation issues with the weapon response and LANL submitted a revised weapon response document this week. Early next week, B&W expects to submit the justification for continued operations (JCO) for the proposed recovery operation on this unit.

The extended downtime in the facility with this unit has prevented maintenance personnel from completing the in-service inspections (ISIs) on the task exhaust, hoists, and static dissipative flooring within their prescribed surveillance periods. Neither the hoists nor the task exhaust are required for the proposed recovery operation; however, the JCO will have to demonstrate that the static dissipative flooring can perform its credited safety function in the absence of the annual ISI. Some of the steps in the annual preventive maintenance (PM) procedure for the deluge fire suppression system could not be performed because maintenance personnel would violate standoff distances or the equipment needed to perform the step had not been approved for use around a nuclear explosive. Fire protection engineering personnel performed an evaluation demonstrating that all *credited* surveillance requirements could be performed and that the steps that could not be performed had no significant relationship to the operability of the system. Maintenance personnel completed the revised annual PM this week.

Conduct of Operations: B&W delivered a W80 joint test assembly (JTA) to the military that did not have a serial number etched on its nose per drawing requirements. Technicians built the JTA using a critical-use procedure (critical-use procedures must be open to the page containing the step being performed and read aloud; placekeeping is required). This procedure directed the technicians to etch the aluminum case *per* a different marking procedure, which was categorized as general-use (general-use procedures may be referred to as necessary; placekeeping is not required). According to the B&W work instruction for procedure adherence, technicians must adhere to the level-of-use category cited in the original procedure if they are directed to a different procedure by the word "per". Manufacturing personnel led a fact-finding exercise this week and discovered that the technicians that built this JTA did not perform the marking procedure using critical-use procedure adherence principles.

Safety Class Hoists: This week, technicians were performing a pre-operational check on a safety class hoist when they observed a hissing noise and noticed the hoist was moving at a reduced speed. Maintenance personnel evaluated the hoist and found a leak in the main pneumatic inlet hose. It appears a small section of the hose had been worn down by a metal brace that was securing the hose to the bridge. Maintenance personnel will replace the deteriorated section of the hose.

Chemical Control Program: As noted in last week's report, the technical safety requirement violation involving the Chemical Control Program was the second violation of that program since November 2010. As a result of these violations, PXSO issued a memo this week stating that these violations are an indication that the work processes, procedures, and formality of operations are not adequate to provide assurance that the program has been implemented with the reliability required of a specific administrative control. The memo requests a corrective action plan within 30 days to address issues with the implementation of the Chemical Control Program.