

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 31, 2001

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Paul F. Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representative
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending August 31, 2001

Staff member Nichols was at Y-12 this week to assist with Site Rep duties. Staff members Moury and Shackelford visited Y-12 to conduct a follow-up review of maintenance.

A. Y-12 Disassembly Preparations: Nichols examined lathes, walk-in hood, cutting fixtures, lifting fixtures, assembly/disassembly areas, vault-type storage areas, and observed procedural validations in preparation for the upcoming disassembly start-up. The procedures being validated appeared to be at an appropriate level of development for the validation activity. As expected, the validation identified many comments on the procedures that will need to be incorporated and checked prior to being used for practice. The principal difficulty encountered in validating the procedures was that a labeling effort had been undertaken while the procedures were being written. The resulting nomenclature differed from that used in the procedures, requiring changes in almost every-other step. Procedure validation should complete this week and practice operations should begin on or about September 5. (2-A)

B. ORNL Building 3019: This week, there were the following developments regarding closure of U-233 Inspection program ORR findings and preparations to commence inspections:

1. On August 29, Gubanc observed operation of the inspection chamber cameras and the radiography of a dummy canister for DOE observers. The equipment which malfunctioned during the DOE ORR worked properly. Conduct of operations continued to be sound.
2. The overpack canister pre-use inspections (pre-start ORR finding) identified that the ORNL fabrication shop is not complying with the lift ring attachment details (attachment screw not tight and secured) and sharp edges/turnings on one item injured a person during handling.
3. On August 29, ORNL issued three "white papers" to further justify its analysis and selection of controls in the authorization basis. ORNL continues to argue that the Stack 3039 HEPAs are not required. DOE is pressing ORNL to establish controls for assuring their integrity.
4. DOE-ORO will identify next week their independent reviewer for closure of the ORR facility safety findings (since the findings suggest DOE-ORO itself requires improvement). (3-A)

C. Y-12 Maintenance Program Review - The staff reviewed the status of maintenance program improvements at Y-12 in response to the Board's March 15, 2001 letter. Progress has been made in improving the work control program, establishing performance metrics (though they still require improvement), developing a facility condition assessment program and improving work packages. However, fundamental problems still exist with YAO oversight, reducing the backlog (230,000 man-hours), collecting maintenance history, providing feedback for improvement, and implementing a preventive maintenance program. Without correcting these fundamental issues and significantly modifying the way maintenance is performed at the site, to include planned outage periods, the maintenance program will continue to be substandard. (1-C)

cc: Board Members