

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**



**LEADERSHIP AND STAFFING  
STRATEGY AND AGENCY WORKPLAN  
FISCAL YEAR 2025**

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## **LEADERSHIP STRATEGY**

Effective Agency leadership is essential to achieving the DNFSB mission. The focus in FY 2025 will be on providing the tools and skill sets necessary for our leaders (current and future) to succeed and propel DNFSB forward toward excellence in all operations. Leadership activities in FY 2025 will focus on developing and honing skillsets through intensive leadership training, conducting offsite discussions on critical agency challenges and cultural issues, and requiring all those in leadership positions to lead a cross-agency project that furthers agency operations and/or addresses a major agency issue. Training for future leaders includes participation leadership development programs, implementation of the PDP program and other skill set development.

## **HUMAN CAPITAL STRATEGY**

DNFSB must provide safety oversight of defense nuclear facilities that aligns with DOE's modernization efforts while ensuring that it has the necessary capabilities to support effective DNFSB operations.

In establishing DNFSB, Congress sought to bring the best talent available to focus on health and safety oversight associated with the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The recruitment and retention of scientific and technical staff with outstanding qualifications are key components in DNFSB's human capital strategy. Key to this effort will be a FY 2025 initiative designed to examine pay flexibilities and determine whether DNFSB maintains the appropriate tools to recruit and retain key technical staff.

Also critical to effective human capital management in FY 2025 will be the development of a knowledge management system as part of implementation of Human Capital Plan to retain institutional knowledge of agency.

Outsourcing of certain operations, while strategically focusing key federal positions, is also key to DNFSB's overall strategy as a small agency. As a small agency, DNFSB cannot efficiently cover the bandwidth of capabilities necessary to maintain compliance with all applicable federal requirements and best practices in human resources, contracting, financial management and other areas without external support. Beginning in FY 2024 and continuing into FY 2025, DNFSB will be outsourcing certain human resources, financial management, and procurement functions to the Department of Interior, Interior Business Center (IBC) and will continue to outsource physical security, certain accounting and payroll processing services, health unit, employee background investigations for security clearances, and Employee Assistance Program services. DNFSB has also contracted out other functions, such as IT help desk and certain IT services. This level of outsourcing will enable DNFSB to prioritize federal positions for mission related, inherently governmental and key strategically focused functions, such as knowledge management and workforce planning.

DNFSB expects to close FY 2024 with approximately 115 full-time equivalents (FTE). Expected FTE levels for FY 2025 will depend on enacted appropriation levels for FY 2025. Should DNFSB receive its requested budget, FTE levels could potentially rise to 128. However, DNFSB

is expected to function under a continuing resolution (CR) for the beginning of the fiscal year and some months into FY 2025, which will impact DNFSB's ability to increase FTE levels early in the fiscal year.

Regardless of FTE levels, during FY 2025, DNFSB will undertake efforts to implement its Human Capital Plan, which is expected to be approved by the Board in early FY 2025.

## **AGENCY WORK PLANS**

### **Agency Direction and Board Support**

The Office of the Executive Director of Operations (OEDO) provides overall agency direction and the immediate office provides direct support to the Board; manages internal communications, external affairs, and the directives program; and oversees the Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility (DEIA) program. Security, risk management and financial and budget functions also reside in the OEDO front office. Key areas of emphasis include building Executive Secretary capabilities, expanding communications, improving agency internal controls, implementing a risk and controls strategy and enhancing the agency's DEIA efforts. Consistent with the delegation from the Chair, the EDO will adjust agency work plan items as needed during the fiscal year, except with regards to legal services which are managed by the Office of the General Counsel.

### **Administrative Services**

The Office of Administrative Services is responsible for the major administrative functions of the Agency. It includes the Divisions of Human Resources, Information Technology, and Operational Services. These functions are fundamentally support functions for the operation of the agency and involve a high degree of customer service. In FY 2025, OAS will focus on incorporating automation and self-service to enhance efficiency and delivery of organizational-level support. This will include enabling staff members, hiring managers, supervisors, and agency leaders to initiate and track the progress of personnel, financial, IT, and security actions. The Agency also plans to update information technology systems, including implementing cybersecurity enhancements. Cybersecurity enhancements include solutions such as Zero Trust Architecture, needed to address issues related to Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) compliance. The agency will also focus on the implementation of the recently issued Human Capital Plan and kick off of workforce planning and analysis and knowledge management initiatives.

## Legal Services

The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) provides direct legal support to the Board in its safety oversight of defense nuclear facilities. OGC also supports the Executive Director of Operations in the execution of agency functions. OGC is the repository of legal resources for the agency and manages the agency's compliance with all legal requirements, including by serving as the lead on several important cross-cutting agency functions (e.g., ethics and alternative dispute resolution).

Most of the work OGC performs is non-discretionary – i.e., it is required by law or necessary for agency operations. This includes Board-directed work and work to support other agency components (e.g., ethics, contract reviews, jurisdictional analysis, Sunshine Act compliance, and employment law). For such work, OGC works regularly to understand the needs and priorities of the agency and adjust its allocation of resources appropriately.

As an integral component of the Agency, OGC also supports organizational efforts such as: implementation of the Human Capital Plan, participating in cross-agency activities and working groups, and engaging with mission areas to enhance support for and understanding of the Agency's core activities.

During FY 2025, the OGC will continue to support the legal requirements of the Board and Agency as a whole.

## Mission Focused

**Introduction.** The Office of the Technical Director (OTD)<sup>1</sup> developed the Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Mission Focused Work Plan based on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) strategic plan and nuclear safety oversight mission. The plan discusses the oversight approach and planning process.

**Approach.** As in previous years, the FY 2025 work plan is based on activities related to Strategic Objective 1.1 – completing timely, high-quality safety reviews that identify and analyze safety issues and best practices, and search for similar challenges complex-wide. To achieve this, OTD developed oversight plans and proposed review activities, with input from subject matter experts (SME) and other interested technical staff. OTD management reviewed and approved the oversight plan strategies and reviewed the proposed review activities. To maximize the strategic value of OTD's nuclear safety oversight, OTD reviews will examine elements of safety culture and the efficacy of DOE's federal oversight, whenever possible.

For FY 2025, OTD management identified 94 high priority reviews consistent with the Board's strategic plan and direction included in the OTD planning memorandum dated May 24, 2024 (see Appendix B). This total includes 38 reviews that will carry over from FY 2024 and 56 new reviews. OTD management selected the reviews ensuring they target all<sup>2</sup> of the strategic topic areas identified in the OTD FY 2025 Planning Guidance. Additionally, the work plan was developed prior to the OTD performance targets being approved in the annual agency performance plan. Therefore, this work plan also allows for a select number of emergent reviews during FY 2025. The total number of reviews in FY 2025 (including reviews that carry over from FY 2024, new reviews identified in this plan, and emergent reviews) will be managed to not exceed 100 reviews.

All technical staff were given the opportunity to volunteer as review leads and/or review team members for any new FY 2025 reviews. OTD management then selected preliminary review leads and team members. As new reviews start throughout the year, OTD will hold additional sign-up periods to accommodate any changes in review leads or team members (e.g., new staff members, changes in review scope, retirements). Prior to reviews starting, the review lead and team will again be reviewed and finalized by OTD management.

**Uncertainties.** Uncertainties associated with the work plan are largely tied to Department of Energy (DOE) schedule changes, emerging work activities, and the potential for technical staff reassignment and attrition. Notably, the limitation of available resources (i.e., workload of SMEs in a specific topic area) may warrant changes in the initial work planned for the FY. Historically, DOE schedule changes tend to result in delays, which may delay OTD's oversight activities throughout the year. Board direction and emergent DOE activities also drive the need to adjust the work plan. Additionally, safety allegations raised by external parties often require technical staff reassignment and work plan adjustment. OTD management will manage these

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
<sup>1</sup> Acronyms are defined in Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> Staff will review the Enhanced Staging Project at NNSS in lieu of Pantex staging/storage due to these individual project's current schedules.

uncertainties by adjusting schedules for reviews in the work plan and incorporating new reviews when necessary, while keeping the total number of reviews at or below 100.

**Non-Review Activities.** Engineering performance (EP) activities in FY 2025 will focus on evaluating OTD performance, developing the annual report to Congress, completing internal assessments, updating procedures, recruiting, work planning, and implementing staff training to achieve the Board’s mission efficiently and effectively. Other non-review activities include staff participation in external consensus bodies. Emergent non-review activities may impact schedules and scope of review activities throughout the year. As in previous years, non-review activities will be performed by employees across OTD.


**Results.** The proposed FY 2025 Mission Focused Work plan includes 94 total reviews; 56 new reviews and 38 FY2024 ongoing reviews.<sup>3</sup> Figure 1 provides the distribution of reviews among the OTD groups in addition to the engineering performance activities, and Figure 2 shows a breakdown by site.



**Figure 1.** *Distribution of Reviews in the Work Plan by Technical Group*

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<sup>3</sup> Ongoing reviews are reviews that were started in FY 2024 (or a previous FY) for which some level of effort will continue into FY 2025. Because reviews are starting throughout the fiscal year, this continuation into the next fiscal year was planned in many cases. If the responsible Associate Technical Director approved a staff report in FY 2024, the review is not considered ongoing.



**Figure 2.** *Distribution of Reviews in the Work Plan by Site*

**Nuclear Weapon Programs (NWP).** OTD’s NWP group performs independent and timely oversight of the safety of operations involving maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile and of weapons-related research, development, and testing. In FY 2025, NWP will conduct effective safety oversight through formal, well-planned reviews at NNSA defense nuclear facilities. This year’s strategic focus includes implementation of safety management programs (e.g., conduct of operations, emergency management, fire protection) and safety basis updates and revisions. Table 1 identifies all NWP reviews selected for the FY 2025 work plan.

**OTD Table 1.** *NWP Reviews*

Title	Oversight Plan
Deactivation and Decommissioning Work Planning and Control	LANL-NNSA
PF-4 DOE-STD-3009-2014 Safety Basis	LANL-NNSA
FY 2025 Recommendation 2023-1, Onsite Transportation	LANL-NNSA
PF-4 DOE-STD-3009-2014 In-Depth Safety Basis Review	LANL-NNSA
Fire Protection Review at LLNL Plutonium Facility (Building 332)	LLNL
Dynamic Criticality Safety Evaluations for Subcritical Experiments	NNSS
Enhanced Staging Project (ESP) Readiness Start-Up Activities	NNSS
Subcritical Experiment Device Response Methodology	NNSS
W78 Nuclear Explosive Safety Study	Nuclear Explosive Safety
W93 Nuclear Explosive Safety in Design Review	Nuclear Explosive Safety
Electrical Tester Equipment at Pantex	Pantex
Pantex Contract Transition	Pantex
Pantex Safety Basis Modernization Follow-up	Pantex
Pantex Training and Conduct of Operations	Pantex
Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) Fuel Health Program Review	SNL



Co-Located Worker Dose Reduction Strategy at the Savannah River Tritium Facilities	SRS-NA
Combined Tritium Facilities Documented Safety Analysis	SRS-NA
Savannah River Site Tritium Emergency Management	SRS-NA
Evaluate Proposal for Non-Zero Deposition Velocity for Tritium Oxide at the Savannah River Tritium Enterprise	SRS-NA
Electrorefining Readiness Activities	Y-12
Reactive Materials Follow-Up	Y-12
Y-12 Fire Protection Program	Y-12
Y-12 Direct Chip Melt Process	Y-12

**Nuclear Materials Processing and Stabilization (NMPS).** The NMPS group performs independent and timely oversight ensuring that the health and safety of the public are adequately protected as DOE disposes of excess radioactive materials, cleans up surplus defense nuclear facilities, and begins operation of new facilities carrying out the mission of the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM). NMPS will conduct effective safety oversight through formal, well-planned safety reviews at DOE-EM defense nuclear facilities. This year’s strategic focus areas included readiness and restart activities, and safety basis updates and revisions. Table 2 identifies NMPS reviews selected for the FY 2025 work plan.

**OTD Table 2. NMPS Reviews**

Title	Oversight Plan
Hanford Conduct of Ventilation HEPA Filter Surveillance Tests	Hanford-ORP
Hanford LAW Readiness Review	Hanford-ORP
Hanford Safety Significant Instrument System (SSIS)	Hanford-ORP
Hanford Site Fire Protection (ORP and RL)	Hanford-ORP
Hanford Tank Farms 242-A Evaporator Restart	Hanford-ORP
FY 2025 Tank and Pipeline Integrity (TAPI)	Hanford-ORP
SY-103 Flammable Gas Retention	Hanford-ORP
Solid Waste Operations Complex DSA Review	Hanford-RL
WESF Dry Capsule Storage Readiness Assessment (W-135 Project)	Hanford-RL
INL Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant Documented Safety Analysis	INL
INL Evaluation of Waste Overpacking Alternatives	INL
Area G DOE-STD-3009-2014 Safety Basis	LANL-EM
Area G DSA Implementation	LANL-EM
FY 2025 National TRU Program Oversight	National TRU Waste Program
FY 2025 Waste Control Specialists Waste Disposition	National TRU Waste Program
TRU Waste Processing Center Safety Basis	OREM
Defense Waste Processing Facility Conduct of Operations	SRS-EM
Savannah River National Laboratory Safety Basis Implementation	SRS-EM
SRS H-Tank Farms Safety Basis	SRS-EM
SRS Readiness and Safety Basis Implementation Processes	SRS-EM
WIPP Salt Handling Shaft Structural Review	WIPP
WIPP Waste Handling Building (WHB) Confinement Ventilation System	WIPP
Review of WIPP SSCVS Readiness Review Activities	WIPP

**Nuclear Programs and Analysis (NPA).** The NPA group performs independent and timely oversight of the development, implementation, and maintenance of DOE regulations, requirements, and guidance for providing adequate protection of public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities, and the establishment and implementation of safety programs at defense nuclear facilities. NPA is responsible for complex-wide programmatic review efforts addressing topics such as nuclear criticality safety, DOE oversight, and emergency management. NPA also leads OTD review of most DOE directives. This year’s strategic focus areas included ongoing engagement with DOE on Recommendation 2020-1, DOE safety directives, emergency management, and cross cutting reviews for nuclear safety and safety management programs. Table 3 identifies the NPA reviews selected for the FY 2025 the work plan.

**OTD Table 3. NPA Reviews**

Title	Oversight Plan
Review of Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG)	Criticality Safety
Review of NCS Program Metrics	Criticality Safety
Field Implementation of DOE Technical Standards	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE 421 Guide, USQ Guide, TSR Guide	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE Order 252.1, Technical Standards Program	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE Order 433.1, Maintenance Management Program	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE-HDBK-3010, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE-STD-1027, Hazard Categorization (R20-1)	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE-STD-1104, Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety Design Basis	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE-STD-3006, Planning and Conducting Readiness Reviews	DOE Directives
FY 2025 DOE-STD-3009, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility DSA	DOE Directives
Emergency Preparedness and Response at WIPP	EP&R
FY 2025 Emergency Exercise Observations	EP&R
Atmospheric Dispersion Modeling: Research	Nuclear Safety
Comparative Assessment of Post Seismic Fires	Nuclear Safety
Credited Controls with Identified Deficiencies	Nuclear Safety
FY 2025 Recommendation 2020-1 Oversight Activities	Nuclear Safety
Roll-up Review of Safety Basis Findings	Nuclear Safety
Contractor Issues Management, Causal Analysis, and Corrective Actions	SMPs
DOE Corporate Operating Experience Program Implementation	SMPs
DOE Facility Representative - Safety Oversight	SMPs
LLNL Conduct of Operations	SMPs
Y-12 Conduct of Operations	SMPs

**Nuclear Facility Infrastructure and Projects (NFIP).** NFIP is responsible for reviewing and evaluating the technical adequacy of complex processes and safety-related systems related to the infrastructure and projects within the DOE’s defense nuclear facility complex. This includes research and development supporting the design of new defense nuclear facilities, design of new or modification of existing component production facilities, and the design of defense nuclear facilities to safely store or treat nuclear wastes resulting from the

production of nuclear weapons. This year’s strategic focus areas included design and construction projects with the highest safety priority, as well as several cross-cutting reviews with the potential for broad applicability across the complex. Table 4 identifies the NFIP reviews selected for the FY 2025 work plan.

**OTD Table 4. NFIP Reviews**

Title	Oversight Plan
Hanford Tank Farms Major Modifications Safety Design Strategy	EM Projects
Revised High Level Waste Facility Project Path Forward	EM Projects
Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Dry Capsule Storage Welding	EM Projects
FY 2025 DOE Standard 1189 revision	EM Projects
FY 2025 DOE Standard 3020 revision	EM Projects
Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System Safety Basis Updates	EM Projects
DOE Complex Wide Oversight of Inspection, Testing and Maintenance (ITM) of Fire Protection Systems	Existing Infrastructure
Public Hearing on Aging Management	Existing Infrastructure
Y-12 Extended Life Program	Existing Infrastructure
Adequacy and Effectiveness of Existing Lightning Protection Systems	Existing Infrastructure
Cast-Iron Fittings	Existing Infrastructure
DAF SSI Analysis, Evaluation of Seismic Upgrades to DAF fire water tank and PULSE Fault Characterization	Existing Infrastructure
FY 2025 DOE-STD-1020, HDBK-1220, NPH Directives	Existing Infrastructure
FY 2025 LANL & SRS Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis	Existing Infrastructure
Los Alamos Glovebox Design, Testing, and Installation	NNSA Plutonium Projects
Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility Fire Protection Review	NNSA Plutonium Projects
SRPPF Facility Worker Safety Follow-up Review	NNSA Plutonium Projects
Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Project PDSA Review	NNSA Plutonium Projects
SRPPF Ventilation Review	NNSA Plutonium Projects
Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) Project Fire Protection Review	NNSA Plutonium Projects
Criticality Safety Evaluations for Design and Construction Projects – UPF	Other NNSA Projects
60% Design Review of Hybrid Fire Extinguishing System at PULSE	Other NNSA Projects
Conceptual Design Review for the Combined Radiation Environments for Survivability Testing Project	Other NNSA Projects
Final PDSAs for Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments Projects	Other NNSA Projects

**Field Operations (FO).** The Field Operations group ensures safe operation of DOE defense nuclear facilities supporting the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and safe operation of DOE defense nuclear facilities designed to process and/or stabilize nuclear materials or the decommissioning of excess defense nuclear facilities. The Field Operations group also runs the Board’s resident inspector program and includes the resident inspectors at five DOE sites. The

resident inspectors periodically conduct focus area reviews to identify negative trends and good practices for a common topic across the sites. During FY 2025, the resident inspectors will conduct a cybersecurity-related focus area review, which is intended to specifically address one of the identified strategic topic areas. For tracking purposes, this topic is among those captured in the Engineering Performance reviews, as shown in Table 5.

**OTD Table 5. *Engineering Performance Reviews***

Title	Oversight Plan
Cybersecurity Focus Area Review Activities	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 OTD Work Plan and Reports	Engineering Performance
OTD Work Plan Development for FY 2026	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 OTD Staff Participation in External Consensus Bodies	Engineering Performance
Annual Report to Congress	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 Internal Control Assessments	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 OTD Procedures	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 OTD Staff Recruiting	Engineering Performance
FY 2025 OTD Staff Training	Engineering Performance
OTD Performance Assessment and Planning	Engineering Performance
Outreach Support for Individual Board Members	Engineering Performance
Safety Basis Review Training	Engineering Performance
Safety Allegations	Engineering Performance

## Appendix A. Acronyms

Acronym	Full Name
ACRR	Annular Core Research Reactor
CSSG	Criticality Safety Support Group
DAF	Device Assembly Facility (NNSS)
DOE	Department of Energy
DOE-EM	DOE Office of Environmental Management
DOE HQ	DOE Headquarters
DSA	Documented Safety Analysis
EM	Environmental Management
EP	Engineering Performance
EP&R	Emergency Preparedness and Response
ESP	Enhanced Staging Project
FY	Fiscal Year
HDBK	Handbook
HEPA	High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter)
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
ITM	Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LAW	Low-Activity Waste Facility (Hanford)
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NCS	Nuclear Criticality Safety
NFIP	Nuclear Facility Infrastructure and Projects
NMPS	Nuclear Materials Processing and Stabilization
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NNSS	Nevada National Security Site
NPA	Nuclear Programs and Analysis
NPH	Natural Phenomena Hazards
NWP	Nuclear Weapon Programs
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OREM	Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management
ORP	DOE Office of River Protection (Hanford)
OTD	Office of the Technical Director
Pantex	Pantex Plant
PDSA	Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
PF-4	Plutonium Facility (LANL)
PULSE	Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Full Name</b>
RL	DOE Richland Operations Office (Hanford)
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMP	Safety Management Program
SNL	Sandia National Laboratories
SNM	Special Nuclear Materials
SPD	Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (SRS)
SRPPF	Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRS)
SRS	Savannah River Site
SSCVS	Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System
SSI	Soil Structure Interaction
SSIS	Safety Significant Instrument System
STD	Standard
TAPI	Tank and Pipeline Integrity
TRU	Transuranic
TSR	Technical Safety Requirement
UPF	Uranium Processing Facility
USQ	Unreviewed Safety Question
WESF	Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility
WHB	Waste Handling Building
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Y-12	Y-12 National Security Complex

## Appendix B. FY 2025 OTD Work Planning Memorandum

May 24, 2024

Memorandum

From: Technical Director

To: Technical Staff

Subject: FY 2025 Planning Guidance

1. **Purpose.** This memorandum provides guidance on the Office of the Technical Director (OTD) portion of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) work plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025. The goal of the OTD planning effort is to identify the optimum set of OTD work activities consistent with the Board's policies, priorities, and strategic plan.
2. **Approach.** The FY 2025 approach requires timely execution by oversight plan owners and subject matter experts, staff participation in identifying reviews, and timely concurrence by OTD management. As such, the technical staff should consider these activities a high priority and work with their supervisors to resolve any schedule conflicts. The schedule for completion of the activities below is provided in Attachment 1.
  - a. *Strategic Direction.* The Board's strategic plan will drive the planning and execution of staff work activities. Proposed staff activities should specifically support the Board's Strategic Objective 1.1, "Complete timely, high-quality safety reviews that identify and analyze safety issues and best practices, and search for similar challenges complex wide." In addition, staff activities support the Board's Strategic Objectives 1.2 and 1.3 on issuing advice and recommendations to ensure safety and providing robust field oversight, respectively. For FY 2025, the staff should incorporate the following areas into oversight plan strategies and review plans. The staff should also recommend additional high priority oversight areas and activities needed to maintain knowledge of defense nuclear activities.
    - i. *Baseline Oversight.* Technical staff should propose staff reviews needed to maintain knowledge of defense nuclear activities (e.g., adequacy of operations, efficacy of safety management systems and programs, and adequacy and implementation of nuclear safety directives). This includes reviews that allow the review team to evaluate on-site conditions at facilities.
    - ii. *Cross-cutting and Multiple-site Analysis.* For FY 2025, consistent with the Board's Strategic Plan, OTD will continue to emphasize identification of staff reviews on topics that impact multiple sites or indicate programmatic/systemic weaknesses. Technical staff should consider proposing cross-cutting or multi-site reviews on topics where:
      - a) The Board's staff has existing indications that a safety-related weakness may exist in a DOE directive or practice at more than

one site. Such weaknesses could include missing requirements, ambiguous or contradictory guidance, inconsistent application of technical standards, or inadequate field implementation.

- b) Further analysis is warranted because DOE has elevated the priority or increased the resources to conduct hazardous operations that will impact one or more sites.
- c) DOE has scheduled a directive for update in RevCom, and additional field-based evidence is needed to assess whether the directive should be revised to address safety deficiencies.
- d) Similar mission activities are performed at multiple sites, or similar safety management programs are credited at multiple sites, and the Board's staff may be able to identify common weaknesses or best practices.
- e) Several site-specific reviews have already been completed for similar mission activities or safety management programs, and further analysis is warranted.
- f) Resident inspector focus areas identified safety concerns that warrant further development by headquarters review teams.
- g) Topics identified by the Board or OTD leadership:
  - Nuclear Safety Research and Development
  - Aging Infrastructure
  - Organizational Culture
  - Contractor Assurance Systems
  - Conduct of Operations
  - Implementation of Contractor and Federal Readiness Activities
  - Emergency Preparedness & Response
  - DOE Implementation Plan Commitments
  - Weapon and SNM Staging/Storage at Pantex Site
  - Subjects Not Recently Reviewed
  - Safety Aspects of Cybersecurity (pending acquisition of appropriate staff resources)

- b. *Oversight Plan Areas.* The cognizant Associate Technical Directors (ATD) will provide direction to oversight plan owners in their group that are responsible for development of oversight plans. The list of oversight plans and owners for FY 2025 is identified in Attachment 2. The Field Operations group will not have any designated oversight plans.



- c. *Oversight Plans.* Oversight plan owners will develop an oversight plan in accordance with OP-521.2-1, *Developing Technical Staff Oversight Plans and Work Plans*. The plan will include an oversight strategy for FY 2025 consistent with the OTD strategic direction, and be based on input from ATDs, resident inspectors, and other technical staff. If needed, oversight plan owners are encouraged to conduct a strategy meeting to support development of the oversight plan, and subsequent review plans. The oversight plan will be documented in SharePoint.
- d. *Identification of Review Plans.* Oversight plan owners will identify potential review plans in accordance with OP-521.2-1 Section 6.C based on OTD strategic direction and oversight strategies. Oversight plan owners will prioritize review plans in accordance with I-514.1, *Technical Staff Internal Work Prioritization and Reporting Decision Criteria*. Technical staff who are not oversight plan owners are encouraged to propose staff reviews to the appropriate oversight plan owner and cognizant ATD. Proposed staff reviews may fall under any group and/or functional area.
- e. *Review Team Members.* The technical staff will review the list of approved FY 2025 staff reviews and, in consultation with their supervisor and oversight plan owners, volunteer as review leads and/or review team members for any new review activities in FY 2025. OTD management will select review leads for most review activities in FY 2025 prior to the start of the FY, and review team members will be finalized as reviews begin throughout FY 2025. Technical staff resources will be adjusted throughout the year to accommodate emerging safety concerns and Board direction.
- f. *OTD Concurrence.* OTD management will evaluate reviews to validate priority, review team lead and members, and schedule. OTD management will also work with OGC management to include appropriate language in the work plan documentation regarding execution of the work plan under loss-of-quorum conditions, Congressional notification requirements, and the necessity to continue providing correspondence to the Secretary of Energy (e.g., up to and including reporting requirements).
- g. *Validate and Report.* The work plan team will validate that the results from the planning exercise are reflected in the SharePoint planning tool. The work plan team will develop the OTD Work Plan document that summarizes the work plan effort and brief the Board on the OTD Work Plan.

### 3. **Guidance.**

- a. *Identification of Potential Reviews.* The following sources will be used to identify potential oversight activities for FY 2025:

- i. New Reviews – reviews identified based on strategic direction, oversight plans, and feedback from technical staff.
  - ii. DOE Standards – review activities focused on Department of Energy directives that are relevant to the Board’s oversight.
  - iii. FY 2024 Carry-over Reviews – all reviews that are scheduled to extend into FY 2025 will be included in the FY 2025 SharePoint planning tool. OTD management will decide whether any of these reviews will be turned off due to resource constraints.
  - iv. FY 2024 Off Reviews – reviews that were turned off in FY 2024 should be considered for inclusion in FY 2025.
- b. *Review Scope, Schedule, and Resources.* Oversight plan owners should limit the scope of reviews such that the review can be completed in a reasonable timeframe. Additionally, the oversight plan owners should clearly define the boundaries of the review so that the scope does not inadvertently increase during execution. Oversight plan owners will estimate the schedule and resources needed (e.g., number of staff and expertise) to complete reviews and other activities based on the scope of the proposed review.
- c. *Engineering Performance Work.* The Engineering Performance oversight plan will contain review plans for internal efforts such as work planning, technical staff training, OTD staff recruitment effort, public hearings, and internal procedures and assessments. It will also include a review plan for staff participation in external consensus bodies. These review plans will be identified with a priority of “EP” and will be managed by designated ATDs.

## ATTACHMENT 1 – Work Planning Schedule

Completion Date <sup>4</sup>	Activity
WED 5/29/2024 <sup>5</sup>	Planning Memo
TUE 6/4/2024	Technical staff training (additional training will occur as needed)
FRI 6/21/2024	Oversight plans completed by oversight plan owners
WED 6/26/2024	Board brief (provide oversight plans to Board prior to briefing)
WED 7/3/2024	Non-oversight plan owners (technical staff) identify potential reviews
FRI 7/12/2024	Staff submit request(s) to participate in a consensus body standard committee to ATD
FRI 7/12/2024	Oversight plan owners rank their potential reviews
FRI 7/19/2024	ATDs individually evaluate review plans to determine proposed set of reviews
FRI 7/26/2024	Management meets to finalize the set of FY 2025 reviews
TUE 7/30/2024	Refresher training on review plan SharePoint fields
FRI 8/9/2024	Staff sign up for review teams and leads
FRI 8/16/2024	ATDs discuss teams and select review leads
MON 8/19/2024	TD/DTD/EDO review and approve results
FRI 9/6/2024	ATDs finalize review teams and leads
Per EDO Direction	Board briefings and notational vote

<sup>4</sup> Completion dates – activities will occur in the period prior to the date.

<sup>5</sup> Schedule will be adjusted based on release of this memo and as needed to produce the optimum OTD Work Plan for FY 2025.

**ATTACHMENT 2 – FY 2025 Oversight Plans and Owners**

<b>Nuclear Weapon Programs (NWP)</b>	
Pantex Plant	Chris Berg
Nevada National Security Site	Sonia Thangavelu
Sandia National Laboratories	Daniel Bullen
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	Daniel Bullen
Y-12 National Security Complex	Dave Andersen
Los Alamos National Laboratory – National Nuclear Security Administration	Mark Bradisse
Savannah River Site – National Nuclear Security Administration	Megan Randby
Nuclear Explosive Safety	Jason Anderson

<b>Nuclear Materials Processing and Stabilization (NMPS)</b>	
Hanford-Office of River Protection	Robert Csillag
Hanford-Richland Operations Office	Brad Sharpless
Savannah River Site – Environmental Management	David Campbell
Idaho National Laboratory	Mark Wright
Los Alamos National Laboratory – Environmental Management	Mark Bradisse
Oak Ridge Environmental Management	Dave Andersen
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant	Erin McCullough
National Transuranic Waste Program	Doug Brown

<b>Nuclear Programs and Analysis (NPA)</b>	
DOE Directives	Sherry Lewis
Nuclear Safety	Frances Sutherland
Safety Management Programs	Chris Beaty
Emergency Preparedness and Response	TBD
Criticality Safety	Brandon Weathers

<b>Nuclear Facilities Infrastructure and Projects (NFIP)</b>	
Environmental Management Projects	David Grover
National Nuclear Security Administration Plutonium Projects	Scott Seprish
Other National Nuclear Security Administration Projects	Austin Powers
Existing Infrastructure	William Dumayas

<b>Engineering Performance (EP)</b>	
Engineering Performance	Richard Tontodonato

**AFFIRMATION OF BOARD VOTING RECORD**

**SUBJECT:** FY 2025 Work Plan

**Doc Control#:** 2025-300-0001

The Board acted on the above document on 11/13/2024. The document was Approved.

The votes were recorded as:

	APRVD	DISAPRVD	ABSTAIN	NOT PARTICIPATING	COMMENT	DATE
Joyce L. Connery	☑					11/12/2024
Thomas Summers	☑					11/13/2024
Patricia Lee	☑					11/13/2024

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote sheets, views and comments of the Board Members.

**Shelby Qualls**

Executive Secretary to the Board

Attachments:

1. Voting Summary
2. Board Member Vote Sheets

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**  
**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Joyce L. Connery

**SUBJECT:** FY 2025 Work Plan

**Doc Control#:** 2025-300-0001

**DATE:** 11/12/2024

**VOTE:** Approved

**COMMENTS:**

None

**Joyce L. Connery**

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Thomas Summers

**SUBJECT:** FY 2025 Work Plan

**Doc Control#:** 2025-300-0001

**DATE:** 11/13/2024

**VOTE:** Approved

**COMMENTS:**

None

**Thomas Summers**

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**  
**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Patricia Lee

**SUBJECT:** FY 2025 Work Plan

**Doc Control#:** 2025-300-0001

**DATE:** 11/13/2024

**VOTE:** Approved

**COMMENTS:**

None

**Patricia Lee**