

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 6, 2024

**TO:** Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** L. Lin and E.P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending December 6, 2024

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** Board's staff member S. Seprish was onsite this week to observe NNSA's Technical Independent Project Review for the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) project.

**Tank Farms:** After removing a pump from Tank 15, a radiological control (RCO) inspector and a construction worker alarmed the personnel contamination monitor when monitoring to exit the radiological area. Both employees were taken to decontamination facility. The RCO inspector had 200,000 dpm beta-gamma/100 cm<sup>2</sup> on the skin of their right elbow and the construction worker had 80,000 dpm beta-gamma/100cm<sup>2</sup> on their modesty clothing above their right knee. Usually, a sleeving deployment device is used to hold the plastic sleeve (used for contamination control) in place while the pump is being lifted up. In this case, the personnel planning the work decided not to employ a deployment device in the work package due to nearby obstructions and the limited space around this pump. While the pump was being lifted, the plastic sleeving got caught and had to be freed in multiple instances, including one worker reaching across the contaminated pump. Several electronic personal dosimeters alarmed on dose rates and one on dose during this time. Personnel moved away from the pump and open riser. Given that the pump was already partially lifted, and the dose rates were still below the suspension limits, management made the decision to proceed with the evolution. After the pump was removed and placed in a container, the workers exited the hut, doffed their protective clothing, and proceeded to the personnel contamination monitor where two of the workers alarmed the monitor. RCO personnel performed follow-up radiological surveys of the travel path and air samplers. During the issue investigation meeting on this issue, personnel discussed the need to have all work groups involved in evaluating the use of sleeving deployment devices when removing equipment from tanks.

**Contract Transition:** DOE-SR directed SRMC and SRNS to develop a plan for H-Canyon, HB-Line, L-Basin and their associated facilities, programs, and personnel to transition from the current Management and Operations contract (SRNS) to the Integrated Mission Completion Contract (SRMC). SRMC is directed to produce the transition plan by January 31, 2025, for DOE-SR's review. The proposed transition date is October 1, 2025, but SRMC and SRNS may propose an alternate transition date for DOE-SR's consideration.

**Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE):** SRTE conducted two issue investigation meetings this week. The first covered the details of an operator causing a protective rupture disk to blow due to operating the plant contrary to approved procedures while attempting to add efficiencies to the process (see 11/22/2024 report). The second dealt with a lockout violation caused by the shift operations manager incorrectly transcribing a work package number when adding a task to a lockout order. In both cases, all parties were forthcoming and management participated appropriately to determine the correct causes and contributing factors.